By Tom Ndahiro
One of the world’s great under appreciated scandals is the role of Catholic Church officials in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, its bloody aftermath in Congo, and the continuing campaign to popularize a revisionist history of the genocide that would advance the malign agenda of those who actively believe that the ‘job is not complete.’
In this latter category of genocide revisionist is Father Philippe de Dorlodot who is a Belgian Catholic priest, and a member of a Congregation of Missionaries of Africa or White fathers. Officially, he should stand for justice and peace, and be opposed to hateful extremists. But this is far from the case in his work in present day Congo.
Philippe de Dorlodot lived in the country since 1970. He spent time in Kinshasa from 1988 to 1993, before being transferred to Bukavu in 1994. There, de Dorlodot became a member and coordinator of the Jeremie group, a Christian group whose mission is, allegedly, to carry the message of peace and social justice. As would be expected, from 1994 onward, this group became concerned with the problems of Rwandan refugees fleeing the genocide’s consequences either as perpetrators or as victims.
In 1996, de Dorlodot collected and published a book, prefaced by Jesuit priest Rigobert Bihuzo Minani, entitled: “Les réfugiés rwandais à Bukavu au Zaire: De nouveaux Palestiniens?” (Rwandan refugees at Bukavu in Zaire: The New Palestinians?). Here is where his role as a Catholic priest becomes aligned with the ongoing mission of the genocidaires who had murdered almost a million Rwandans.
The publication was a compilation of various declarations made by extremist Hutu churchmen, human rights groups, NGOs and several other associations with the aim of “making known the problem of Rwandan refugees in Kivu”.
The well known academic, Filip Reyntjens penned a post-script to the book. Reyntjens concurred with de Dorlodot’s opinion that forced repatriation was unacceptable and voluntary repatriation was unthinkable, given the situation prevailing in Rwanda: supposedly with prisons resembling concentration camps, disappearances, and massacres that could easily be qualified as genocide. Reyntjens echoed this, and identified only one remaining option: armed repatriation. These “new refugees”, he said, could not be kept in “eternal exile.” His opinion was topped off with a warning that if the international community did not listen to the “cries of alarm” coming out of South Kivu, “the tragic events of the past year will have been merely a prelude, with the worst still to come”.
This was an idea he shared with at least one of the genocidaire ideologues and leaders, Stanislas Mbonampeka. Mbonampeka is a Hutu extremist who served as Minister of Justice in 1992 and 1994 after the genocide. In the camps in Zaire, he declared in an interview with an NGO-sponsored magazine that refugees could not return to Rwanda because they saw the RPF as “incarnated devils” who “eliminate people discreetly, hiddenly.” Mbonampeka threatened that if the RPF did not negotiate the only alternative would be “to prepare ourselves to fight.”
Like most proponents of this position, de Dorlodot was convinced that neither Zaire nor the new authorities in Kigali were interested in the refugees. He wondered — and this was also the title of his compendium — whether Rwandan refugees who were rejected by everybody would not become the “new Palestinians”.
He divided his book in three more or less equal parts. The first was devoted to various testimonies from individuals who had managed to flee Rwanda at the beginning of the massacres, most of them foreign expatriates or Hutu who told stories of “horrors committed from April to July 1994”. The second was about the influx of “Rwandan survivors” who went to Zaire, and the difficulties they experienced in settling down. This was the “emergency” period. The people he called survivors were Hutus who were in a French protected zone, many of whom were core genocidaires from the former prefectures of Gikongoro, Kibuye and Cyangugu.
As far as Philippe de Dorlodot was concerned, the biggest problem of Hutu refugees was that they were hurt by the image they were given in international media, especially on radio broadcasts. They felt despised everywhere. As long this situation continued, de Dorlodot saw “the prospects of their peaceful return home  receding.” He quoted the Archbishop of Bukavu’s line, “there are things one sees better with eyes that have shed tears”, to illuminate what he saw as the “tragedy that has befallen the refugees.”. De Dorlodot explained:
They lost everything: their country, their land, their diplomas, their jobs, their income, their future….They feel abandoned, they are humiliated. But they keep their dignity. They want to live.
This second part therefore told of “this distress, this emergency of the needs coupled with the slowness of aid”. It talked also of “the positions taken by the Civil Society on the dramatic situations, the conditions for the return”.
The third part, dominated by the speeches of Bishop Christopher Munzihirwa (six out of thirteen messages of the whole book) was called “Le temps de l’inquiétude, janvier-octobre 1995” (Times of anxiety, January-October 1995). The messages were addressed to either refugees or the international community.
At the core of this last part was the issue of the return of the refugees. De Dorlodot was among those who thought that if the authorities in Kigali did not accept political negotiations with the representatives of the refugees under the Hutu genocidaires’ group Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy (RDR), the world should expect unrest in the entire sub-region.
Regarding this issue, he wrote in his “memorandum on the conditions for the return of Rwandan refugees” that “[t]his issue of return is political, and its solution cannot be but political.” While he acknowledged that it was up to Rwandans, first and foremost, to find this solution, he also stressed the need for assistance from the international community.
He said that the refugees would go back to Rwanda voluntarily and peacefully if they were guaranteed dignity and security, or under arms if not. This is what Bishop Munzihirwa had written to Cardinal Danneels and Bishop Delaporte, president of Pax Christi and president of Justice et Paix France, respectively. In his comments about this letter, de Dorlodot called it a call to urge their countries (Belgium and France) to pressure Rwanda to find a negotiated solution for the return of the refugees. He cited to Archbishop Munzihirwa’s remarks that “it is unacceptable that the Western democratic countries give unconditional support to the regime in Kigali which excludes the right to expression and discourages the return home of a third of its population”.
In one of its press releases dated January 25, 1995, the Jeremie group (Bukavu) addressed this subject in no unclear terms under the title: “Non à l’aide occidentale inconditionnelle à Kigali alors qu’un genocide sélectif se commet au Rwanda” (No to unconditional western aid to Kigali when there is a targeted genocide being committed in Rwanda). De Dorlodot was a member of this group and one of the signatories of this press release, which concluded by deploring the fact that the western countries had just granted a considerable financial aid for the reconstruction of Rwanda. The press release wondered how democratic countries could “help unconditionally the government in Kigali which is carrying out a targeted genocide against the Hutu and which is practically discouraging and making it impossible for two million refugees in Zaire to return home”.
In addition to de Dorlodot, the press release’s signatories included François Maheshe, Jean Tubibu, Fr. Rigobert Minani, Remy Mitima, Denis Buhendwa, Georges Bahaya, Fr. Joseph Venerio, Deogratias Kiriza, Sr. Maria Alexis, Fr. Andre Cnockaert, Fr. Natale Tomasi, Monsignor François-Xavier Mitima, Fr. Jean-Baptiste Ruhangamugabo, Prof. Modeste Wasso and Fr. Dieudonné Ndejeje.
The Jeremie group and GRAPES (Groupe de Réflexion et d’Analyse du diocese de Bukavu) went even farther, accusing the authorities in Kigali of planned elimination of the Hutu who had remained in Rwanda. They said it openly in a March 15, 1995, communiqué:
Credible sources from Rwanda inform us that the authorities in Kigali are preparing genocide in the prefectures of Kigali, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi which is already being executed in the prefecture of Butare. We hear for example that every evening, a truck goes to Kigali prison; at night, prisoners are carried away and disappear for good…. How can these massacres be passed over in silence?… Is there no other option for Rwandan refugees than to die of hunger in Zaire or of genocide in Rwanda? What kind of aid does Rwanda need? To build new prisons? To contribute to the fair trial of all the perpetrators of the massacres? Or to put pressure on Kigali for true negotiations leading to the return of the refugees?
This was not the only time that de Dorlodot criticized the RPF under the cover of the Jeremie group (Bukavu). In a press release of April 11, 1995, he accused the government of Rwanda of preventing trucks carrying supplies from reaching the refugees. He called this an unjustified and criminal act. In another release the following day, he accused the RPF of having attacked Birava Hutu refugee camp on the nights of April 11 and 12, 1995, killing thirty-one refugees and wounding more than 54. Medical stocks for the camp were said to have been set on fire, according to another press release of April 13, 1995. All these releases were signed by de Dorlodot and Fr. R. Minani for the Jeremie group.
His name appeared again in an open letter dated April 13, 1995 sent by the “human rights defence groups and the bone and sinew of South Kivu (Bukavu) to the Government of Rwanda and the military regime of Kigali, following the massacres of the refugees in Birava camp (Bukavu).” The letter protested “the unspeakable attacks against innocent persons, the violation of the Zairian territory and of basic human rights”. Besides de Dorlodot, it was signed by Bishop Mitima F.X (vicar general of Archdiocese of Bukavu and member of GRAPES), JB Ruhangamugabo (member of GRAPES-Bu.Co/Civil Society), Minani Bihuzo (member of Groupe Jérémie-GRAPES/Civil Society), Dr. Miteyo Nyenge (President of CRONGD/South Kivu), Bagenda Balagizi (member of Groupe d’Etude et d’Analyse Politique/Sud-Kivu), Fr. Pio De Mattia (in charge of ASUMA, or Association des Supérieurs Majeurs), Maria Alexis (member of Groupe Reine de la Paix-GRAPES), Jean Migabo Kalere (member of Commission Justice et Paix/Archdiocese of Bukavu) and others.
De Dorlodot even took it upon himself to bring imaginary proof of the responsibility of RPF soldiers in this attack. He did this in a press release dated April 22, 1995, in the following words: “Here is the reason why we said that it was RPF soldiers who attacked Birava camp.” Then he proceeds to list the reasons:
1. Witnesses living in Ibinja Island (Zaire) saw soldiers leaving the nearby Nkombo Island (Rwanda) in boats. Their testimony was written and signed by several persons and sent to Geneva.
2. Witnesses heard these soldiers talking among themselves and on “motorola” in Kinyarwanda, English and Ugandan Swahili.
3. The destruction of the dispensary of medical supplies and the savage killing of tens of women and children bore the mark of RPF. Witnesses who lived in Byumba and who were familiar with the behavior of the RPF reported that since the beginning of the war in October 1990, RPF targeted medical supplies and killed the “displaced” in order to create panic.
4. It was not the first time that RPF soldiers violated the Zairian territory. Since the beginning of the year, they had frequently violated it.
In “Quelques vérités sur l’enfer rwandais” (Some truths on the Rwandan hell), a text he wrote on July 26, 1994, de Dorlodot demands that western governments “stop imposing unacceptable solutions to the majority of the population which result in greater catastrophes.” He insisted that there had been two genocides in Rwanda, perpetrated by extremists from both sides. He acknowledged that there was a genocide against the Tutsi committed by some authorities, soldiers and the interahamwe, but added that there was a genocide that was rarely mentioned: the one committed by RPF in the “occupied regions”. The “massive massacres” committed by the RPF, he claimed, were no secret to anyone, and the previously lacking evidence had started to be uncovered. For example, he wrote:
The whereabouts of some 400 to 500,000 displaced persons in Byumba prefecture are not known: were they killed by RPF or are they in the camps? Moreover, at least two camps of Hutu displaced have disappeared; the camp of Kanyanza (Kabgayi) with 100,000 persons from Gitarama and the camp of Butaro in Runaba parish with 35,000 persons. People have been searching for them in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, but in vain. There is no trace of these refugees. Aren’t they those tens of thousands of bodies seen in Lake Victoria?
De Dorlodot pointed to the dismantling of Kibeho camp in Rwanda in 1995 as proof there had been double genocide in Rwanda. The one committed by the RPF was “one which people pretend to ignore and about which the West does not like to talk.” He continued:
This other genocide which started with the beginning of the war in October 1990 took on terrifying proportions: the countless disappearances, arbitrary detentions of 40,000 to 50,000 people crammed in prisons — between 4 and 6 per m2, many of whom are women and children. And now Kibeho! This camp was dismantled with the objective of eliminating the many intellectuals living there, according to some experts on Rwanda. And there are 70,000 survivors of Kibeho who are wandering on hills, exhausted, and in danger of dying.”
According to de Dorlodot, the dismantling of Kibeho camp revealed the true nature of the government of Kigali, which did not want the return of the refugees and instead carried out ethnic cleansing. He then referred the High Commissioner for Refugees to the letter by Bishop Munzihirwa about the refugees, in which he accused the Government of Rwanda of lying about welcoming the refugees home. In the letter, Munzihirwa said the Government was demanding money for the refugees that the Vice-President and General Kagame had openly despised and insulted the refugees in speeches, and that ministers advocating for dialogue had been dismissed. The refugees had “clear reasons to fear returning home,” he added. They had been sent a message through the killings at Kibeho: “If you return, this is the fate that awaits you”.
De Dorlodot supported his theory of double genocide by referring to the words of a certain Pierre Erny. Although Erny admitted that “Tutsi were attacked because they were Tutsi” — and that therefore there was undeniably a genocide against the Tutsi — he maintained that the RPF did the same. He said that “an entire population was simply erased from the map, mainly in the North and the East, and not exactly for military reasons.” He called the evidence “indisputable and massive.” At Kibeho, he said, “there were no witnesses to count the dead and contradict official figures.” Given his adherence to this version of events, he found it “difficult to doubt that there was genocide on both sides”, and believed there was therefore a crime against humanity that demanded the world’s attention.
Furthermore, he saw the world’s failure to recognize this second genocide as a ”major political mistake” over which many would lose credibility on the international scene. Erny thought the reason no international tribunal had been set up to specifically investigate this genocide by RPF was because “you are judged differently depending on whether you are powerful or poor”. The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, he said, had a mandate that was restricted to exclude the massacres committed by RPF, “a rather unilateral way of dispensing justice”.
Concerning the return of the refugees, de Dorlodot’s proposals were close to those put forth by the RDR and its president François Nzabahimana in their “Charter for the Return.” In fact, for de Dorlodot, “the problem of the return of the refugees is political and requires a political solution. For him, the solution was as simple as “opening negotiations in the spirit of the Arusha Accords.” He called the establishment of the RDR “an attempt to present credible persons with clean hands,” and said that “[t]he support of the Army in exile to this movement gives it its true value”.
In short, in his writing, de Dorlodot kept going back to the RPF and the Tutsi in general, alleging a second genocide which, according to him, was committed by the Tutsi of the RPF against the Hutu. In this way, he justifies the genocide of the Tutsi. De Dorlodot went further in his revisionism by denying that there was peace in Rwanda after the genocide and claiming that the Hutu continued to run away from the RPF’s terror.
Clearly, de Dorlodot is a subtler revisionist than his colleague Serge Desouter, who denies categorically the very existence of the genocide against the Tutsi. De Dorlodot, on the other hand, recognizes it but balances it with another genocide allegedly committed by the RPF against the Hutu. By deliberately sowing confusion about the real facts and obscuring the particular nature of events, de Dorlodot denies the true genocide against the Tutsi.
The real problem de Dorlodot feels he has to grapple with, like all the other genocide deniers and accomplices of the genocide perpetrators, is the RPF. For him, the RPF is guilty of having seized power in Kigali by arms after killing and displacing the Hutu from the North, and for having killed two Hutu Presidents, the President of Rwanda and the President of Burundi. Through these actions, he believes, the RPF caused the extermination of the Tutsi inside the country and forced three million Hutu into exile. These Hutu dreams of returning home, but once again, the RPF have stood in their way, with the terror and violence of the RPF government and its desire to exterminate the Hutu. The refugees hope that political negotiations will enable them to return in security and dignity. Once again, it is the RPF which is against this and which “rejects any idea of negotiation on power sharing, arguing that everything was negotiated in Arusha and that those who so wish are free to return and take part in public life.”
Truth remains despite attempts at revision
Opinions of this priest and others who extol genocidaires were far from truth. It is well known that when the routed army and militia crossed the border to Zaire they generally held their weapons in reserve and gained control over the refugees in the camps. The genocidaires in the camps instituted measures to discourage refugees from repatriating to Rwanda. This killing machine enforced its dictates with vicious intimidation and frequent murders. The international community that did nothing to halt the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda became further complicit in atrocities by allowing the refugee camps to be converted into bases for the genocidaires in their war against the government of Rwanda.
This would have a lasting effect on the security in the region, as Ambassador Aldo Ajello rightly observed, who was a long time Special Representative of the European Union for the Great Lakes Region based in Brussels. Addressing an International Conference on Security and Co-operation in Central Africa in 2001, he said that those responsible for the genocide, including the defeated Rwandan army (FAR) and the Interahamwe militias, “were afterwards allowed to settle, still armed, in refugee camps together with bona fide refugees.” Since then, he said, “these highly militarised camps have been used by them as bases for recruitment and training, as well as the launch of regular incursions into Rwanda in preparation of a major offensive.”
Ajello recalled that for two years, i.e. from 1994 to 1996, “the vice president of Rwanda at the time, Major-General Paul Kagame, made strong appeals to the international community to separate the armed forces from bona fide refugees in the camps.” In fact, he said, “[n]either the international community nor the UN could or wanted to address this problem, which they considered too difficult and risky.” All they did was supply humanitarian aid to refugees in the camps. The absence of a solution to this problem, he pointed out, led to the war in the former Zaïre in 1996 and the replacement of President Mobutu by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. A couple years later, in August 1998, the situation in the refugee camps was once again “one of the major factors that contributed to the outbreak of the present regional crisis, one of the most complex in African history.”
From February 15 to 17, 1995, in Bujumbura, Burundi, there was an OAU/UNHCR Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region. Addressing the gathering Ms. Sadako OGATA, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, reiterated that the genocide against the Tutsi was one of the darkest chapters in modern history, and declared that “[n]ever should this happen again”.
The UNHCR boss was aware conditions of security in the Rwandese refugee camps had for a long time deteriorated. She said that “[b]anditry, gang attacks, extortion and diversion of assistance from the most vulnerable, harassment of humanitarian personnel and the elimination of any form of dissent or perceived dissent, have marked the past few months.” The UNHCR recognized the progress in repatriation of refugees to Rwanda, highlighting the voluntary return of some 200,000 refugees to Rwanda through official border points near Goma between July 1994 and mid-January 1995.
In his statement, Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary General of Organization of African Unity, said Rwanda was still reeling from the effects of those horrendous acts of human destruction. He added, however, that “[a]ccess to and control of relief and its distribution by the armed elements in the refugee camps has given them added power of coercion and manipulation.” This situation undermined the entire system and structure of relief distribution, and had a long-term effect on the very future of the repatriation process.
According to a UNHCR report, unprecedented level of violence had characterized the situation of refugee camps in eastern Zaire, and threats by genocide perpetrators against those who wished to repatriate varied from one day to another.
Other reports say the Rwandan government worked in close collaboration with UNHCR and other international organizations to facilitate the mass repatriation of 600,000 Rwandan refugees from eastern Zaire. A Refugees International report called the RPF “very disciplined” and local government authorities “cooperative”. The Rwandan leadership “encouraged the unfettered and immediate return of refugees to their home communes”.
In their joint press release on November 3, 1994, 16 international NGOs described the situation in the camps as “unacceptably dangerous”. In a report of Medecin sans Frontiers from July 1995, MSF said the refugees had been convinced by their leaders that it was too dangerous to go back to Rwanda, a conviction that was reinforced by the anti-RPA propaganda and hate campaign carried out by camp leaders.
According to MSF, “refugees wishing to return home were virtually held hostage by the camp leaders,” and “adequate protection for refugees needed to be guaranteed in order for them to feel free to return home or remain in the camp without fearing for their lives”. This situation led to the withdrawal of several NGOs from the camps, both in Zaire and Tanzania.
There are many testimonies attesting to the fact that civilians resisted following the Interahamwe and ex-FAR risked death in late 1996, when the Rwandan Patriotic Army and Zairean rebels forced closure of the camps. One such civilian, Eliazar Nkanyundo, aged 30, explained that “if you refused to go with them, you were killed”.
In May 1998, Dennis McNamara of the UNHCR said that when his organisation tried to coordinate return convoys from the camps, the convoys “were attacked by the leadership of the refugee population opposed to repatriation”. There were appeals early on for separation of the refugee civilian population from ex-FAR, the ex-military, the militia, the Interahamwe and the genocidaires, who made up the political leadership. Those appeals, he said, “started almost immediately after the exodus, and they were, by and large, ignored by the international community”. He recalled that in October 1994 the High Commissioner for Refugees “publicly announced the risks in the camps by the control and the intimidation of the militia and the control of the assistance in the camps through the political-military leadership of those camps”. Soon after, the High Commissioner formally requested that the United Nations give military support “to ensure separation of the fighters from the civilians of the genocidaire from the civilians”.
Devious revisionism that uses falsehoods to hide the material reality of facts, such as that of de Dorlodot, is as serious as the straightforward revisionism preached openly and loudly by Desouter. The two revisionisms lead to the same result: denying the uniqueness of the only internationally recognized Rwandan genocide, that of the Tutsi. Both should be denounced with force and determination.
As Chief of Staff of USAID Richard McCall recapped before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations:
Genocide is a historical event that informs history from the day it begins and forever into the future. We have a problem. The international community initiated its long-term engagement with Rwanda by accommodating violence, and we allowed the genocidaires to set up shop in the camps. Unfortunately, this contributed to the institutionalization of violence, rather than breaking the cycle of impunity which gave rise to the genocide in the first place. The solution to that problem is to be unequivocally clear about the genocide and its perpetrators. The nature of the evil continuing to plague the region cannot be underestimated. Not only are the genocidaires committed to finishing what was left undone in 1994, but they continue to be willing to kill and sacrifice their own people to do so.
To sum up, these priests of hate, like some European NGOs and their Hutu extremist partners in the North Kivu and South Kivu, had the same discourse with regard to the problem of Rwanhome that what happened in Rwanda in the early 1990s were simply inter-ethnic massacres. In their opinion, the main cause of these massacres was the RPF, which, after killing President Habyarimana, refused to recognize the interim government and resumed fighting to seize power in Kigali. These advocates of hatred want the world to believe RPF was responsible for the extermination of the Tutsi by the Hutu. The Hutu, in their opinion, had been provoked by the RPF, which had been fighting and killing the Hutu since 1990 and had sent the majority of the population in exile. The population wanted to return home, provided RPF guaranteed them security, released their illegally occupied properties and accepted equitable sharing of power where the majority felt represented.
Finally, one must assume that revisionist White Fathers, (read more from ‘Genocide against the Tutsi: Analysis of forms and expressions of its denial’) including Philippe De Dorlodot, Serge Desouter, Walter Aelvoet, Guy Theunis, Jef Vleugels, Jean Chaptal and their other colleagues, enjoy the backing and support of their superiors. Otherwise, why have the latter never disassociated themselves from the false and criminal positions disseminated with impunity by these bigot missionaries who are members of the White Fathers Society? What will they tell God, whom they claim to represent on Earth and in whose name they claim to work?
April 5, 2011
 Philippe de Dorlodot, Les réfugiés rwandais à Bukavu au Zaire. De nouveaux Palestiniens, Groupe Jérémie -L’Harmattan, Paris 1996, p.5.
 Traits d’Union Rwanda No 5 published in Ghent, Belgium—November 1994, (p.23)
 Ibid, pg. 24
 Philippe de Dorlodot, Les réfugiés rwandais à Bukavu au Zaire. De nouveaux Palestiniens, p. 77
 P. de Dorlodot, Les réfugiés rwandais …, p. 213
 This letter was dated 16 January 1995 and its subject was: Call for pressure with a view to a negotiated solution in Rwanda for the return of the refugees.
 Idem, Les réfugiés rwandais à Bukavu …au Zaïre, p.164.
 Idem, Les Réfugiés rwandais…, p.166.
 Idem, Les réfugiés rwandais…, p.167.
 Idem, Les réfugiés rwandais…, p.184.
 Idem, Les réfugiés rwandais…, p. 189
 Idem, Les réfugiés rwandais…, p. 88
 The letter was written by the Archbishop of Bukavu, Munzihirwa Christophe, to the High Commissioner for Refugees on 6 October 1995. Talking about this letter, Bishop Munzihirwa wrote: “An important letter from Bishop Munzihirwa to the High Commissioner for Refugees. (…) The refugees are no longer wanted in Zaire and it appears Rwanda does not want their return. A new problem of Palestinians is therefore being created in Central Africa which is highly likely to cause conflicts on the borders. The International Community may put the necessary pressure to stop the escalation of this violence and guarantee the return of the refugees in security”.
 Ibid, Les Réfugiés rwandais…, p. 233
 Idem, Les Réfugiés rwandais…, p. 194. The views of Pierre Erny were published in Dimanche (Mons, Belgique) of 26 November 1995, p.2.
 Idem, Les Réfugiés rwandais…, p.212.
 Idem, Les Réfugiés rwandais…, p.243. Postscript of F. Reyntjens
 Aldo Ajello, Working Towards Sustainable Peace Published in African Security Review Vol 10 No 2, 2001 See: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/10No2/Ajello.html
 Burundi, 15-17 February 1995 , 17 February 1995, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/438ec9052.html [accessed 21 September 2010]
 Ibid 1995/BUJCONF.1: NOTE ON REFUGEE SITUATION IN THE SUB-REGION (submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/438ec9052.html
 Refugees International, REPORT No15 of December 17, 1996
 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERE (MSF) DEADLOCK IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CRISIS :Virtual Standstill on Repatriation July 1995 (p. 7) fn 13, quoting Reig Miller, ‘Rwandan Refugees’, Associated Press, 7 July 1995
 James C. McKinley Jr., “Refugees Say Fighting Continues In Zaire” The New York Times, November 28, 1996
 Statement by Dennis McNamara, Director, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, to the House Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on International Operations and Human Rights – Hearing on “Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence” 5 May 1998. See : http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,SPEECH,UNHCR,,42b81cd22,0.html and http://www.unhcr.org/42b81cd22.html
 Statement by Richard McCall, as Chief of Staff, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to the House Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on International Operations and Human Rights – Hearing on “Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence” 5 May 1998.See: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa49306.000/hfa49306_0.HTM